



The Development of Pay Scales  
under Collective Agreements in  
the Metal and Electrical  
Engineering Industries in Germany

from 1990 to 2017

**GESAMT****METALL**

*Die Arbeitgeberverbände der Metall- und Elektro-Industrie*

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Gesamtmetall – Federation of German Employers' Associations  
in the Metal and Electrical Engineering Industries  
Vossstraße 16  
10117 Berlin  
GERMANY

[www.gesamtmetall.de](http://www.gesamtmetall.de)  
info@gesamtmetall.de

## Introductory remarks

Nearly three decades have now passed since the Berlin Wall came down. How have wages and salaries in the metal and electrical engineering industries in Germany developed since reunification? What demands has the IG Metall trade union tabled in negotiations? How have the employers responded in terms of offers or counter-demands? Have there been strikes or arbitration? Where the pilot settlements could be reached? How high were the financial burdens on the employers? And what levers are available to unions and employers to make adjustments? This brochure aims to provide answers to all these questions, which are regularly at the center of public interest.

The aim of this compilation is to present a clear overview of the most important quantitative and qualitative features of the collective bargaining rounds that have taken place since 1990. For a more detailed and profound analysis, we recommend consulting the respective collective-agreement archives or the annual reports of Gesamtmetall and its member associations.

In addition to a summary of the most important results, this brochure also contains a mini-dictionary on the mechanics of collective bargaining and a detailed section of tables.

The switch to the "Single Status Pay Agreement" (ERA) for former blue and white collar workers in 2008 unfortunately caused a break in the time series on annual incomes under the collective agreement; the figures are therefore not comparable with the previous years.


Despite our considerable efforts to make this presentation exhaustive, a few data gaps remain, particularly with regard to the number of warning strikes. Gesamtmetall has no useable documentation for the period prior to 1999. The same applies to the number of regional collective-bargaining talks held per round.

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## 1. Development of wages and salaries

The employees of the metal and electrical engineering industries have participated significantly in economic development over the past 27 years. Their actual annual pay under the collective agreement rose in nominal terms since the reunification up to more than 107 percent. Even taking inflation into account, there remains an increase in real wages of about 30 percent. An employee in the metal and electrical industries (M+E) who earned in 1990 about € 24,500 reached only due to the collectively agreed wage increases approximately € 50,940 in 2017. Additionally, the growth is still higher if bearing in mind the changes of the employment structure i.e. the shift to more qualified and better paid work.




For this analysis it is immaterial whether we look at the actual or the sustained annual pay under the collective agreement – i.e. whether one-off and lump-sum payments are added or not. These elements are of no importance for long-term studies, since they only change pay under the collective agreement during the relevant period, but not permanently. Income growth therefore remains almost identical when one-off and lump-sum payments are excluded: nearly 105 percent in nominal terms, and just under 30 percent in real terms.

Taking the average figures for the period from 1991 to 2016, M+E employees' income rose by an annual of € 900 per year. Only in 1994, the yearly payments remained unchanged while the salary curve showed partially a steep rise up during all the other years.

## M+E collective bargaining rounds

### Increase of actual annual pay under the collective agreement

Monthly pay, Christmas bonus, holiday bonus plus all one-off and lump-sum payments compared to previous year \*) in euros



\*) Year-on-year change: from 2009 based on ERA; before 2009 without ERA


Development of wages and salaries

The analysis of pay scales under collective agreements also shows that the protection of real wages succeeded almost always. Only in six of 25 years was the pay increase over the calendar year lower than the (in some cases sharp) rise in consumer prices.

## M+E collective bargaining rounds

### Rates of change of the actual annual pay under the collective agreement in (real) terms

Monthly pay, Christmas bonus, holiday bonus plus all one-off and lump-sum payments, real\*) change compared to previous year\*\*) as %




\*) Assumed 2011 inflation rate: 2.3%, \*\*) Year-on-year change: from 2009 based on ERA; before 2009 without ERA

Development of wages and salaries

## 2. Demands and settlements

Experience shows that the demands of the IG Metall trade union tend to follow economic developments. As a rule the union reacts to past, not expected economic development. This is why it has entered the wage bargaining process with high demands even when signs of an economic slowdown or even a recession were long-since visible on the horizon – for example in the wake of the reunification boom of the early nineteen-nineties and later after the strong upswing between 2006 and 2008.


The IG Metall has a macroeconomic orientation to justify its demands, focusing on the parameters of *productivity growth* and the *rise in inflation*. In the recent past it uses therefore the medium-term trend of the productivity development and the targeted inflation rate of the European Central Bank (ECB).



A further element is the so-called *redistribution component*: employees sometimes build up a high backlog of expectations, especially during periods of economic turnaround. The breeding ground for this distribution illusion among workers – i.e. their subjective impression that they have had a bad deal during the previous boom – is usually rising corporate profits and higher inflation rates. These are typical of the final phase of an upswing and a sure sign that the business cycle is past its best. The union, however, usually markets this as a "profit explosion" and a "wave of price increases" to justify a demand that is no longer in line with the situation. This cannot be satisfied by recourse to the two parameters of productivity and inflation alone.

The union traditionally solves this legitimacy problem by bringing an additional, third variable into play: the *redistribution component* – also often referred to as a "need to catch up", "the employees' expectations" or, most recently, the "fairness component". In years of economic turnaround, this component accounts for a considerable portion of the union's demand. This was most striking in 2008 when the economy took a dive of unprecedented severity and speed: at that time, half of the union's demand was based on non-measurable parameters.

In the bargaining round 2012 this component – which could not be grounded by facts and was therefore occasionally indicated as “virtual” or “hot air” by employers – even made up more than half of the demand. For the first time, the IG Metall requested within the framework of their demand a concrete estimated amount as they didn't exploit from their point of view their defence margin during the previous year. In the recent past it succeeds to limit relatively the reallocation component only by recourse to the targeted inflation rate of the ECB (2 percent) and the trend rate of productivity.




Although the IG Metall's demand grew in size continuously from 2006 to 2008, and wage bargaining was accompanied (at least in 2006) by a significant degree of mobilization, the cost burden of the settlement (related to a 12-month term) remained stable at three percent in all three years. This finding suggests that size of the demand and the intensity of the warning strikes can sometimes also have internal political motives.



## M+E collective bargaining rounds

### Duration of warning strikes




Source: Gesamtmetall

Development of wages and salaries

## M+E collective bargaining rounds

### Establishments affected by warning strikes



Source: Gesamtmetall

Development of wages and salaries

### 3. Modernization of regional collective bargaining

Since 1997 an increasing number of establishment-related components (*betriebliche Komponenten*) have found their way into industry-wide collective bargaining; since 2006 (at the latest) they have become an integral part of modern collective agreements. In normal years, the combination of three elements – wage increases, one-off payments and establishment-related components – has succeeded quite well at making the regional collective agreement (*Flächentarifvertrag*) flexible enough to take account of the increasingly diversifying economic situations in different establishments and branches in the metal and electrical industry:


- The 2006 settlement provided, among other things, for a one-off payment of € 310. This could be doubled to € 620 or reduced to € 0.
- The 2007 settlement contained an option of postponing the 0.7 percent economic-cycle-related bonus and the second stage of the wage increase (1.7 percent) by up to four months.
- The 2008/09 settlement offered as many as three levers: the € 510 lump sum could be paid later – in January 2009 instead of December 2008. The parties to the collective agreement could also postpone the second stage of the wage increase (2.1 percent) from May to December 2009 and reduce the € 122 lump sum to as little as € 15.25.
- The 2010 settlement included a 2.7 percent pay rise on 1 April 2011, which could be brought forward or postponed by up to two months.
- The 2016 settlement included the following regulation for differentiation: For companies in economic difficulties, it is possible – upon request of the employers' association and after decision of the IG Metall – to postpone the lump-sum payment of € 150 or to eliminate it completely. Besides, the increase of the 2<sup>nd</sup> wage step could be postponed up to 3 months.

Such establishment-related adjustment options *within* the regional collective agreements must be distinguished from the option agreed in the 2004 Collective Agreement for Securing the Survival of Company Locations ("Pforzheim Agreement") of replacing the industry-wide pay scale by supplementary collective agreements. These supplementary collective agreements offer establishments unlimited possibilities to deviate from the regional collective agreement and to make their own arrangements in terms of both content and money. As a rule, however, they require investment or employment pledges from the employer and the mandatory consent of both parties to the collective agreement.

### 4. Further data

The history of collective bargaining shows that the negotiation marathon fluctuates in waves between 41 and 60 regional rounds. In the three years from 2006 to 2008 there was again a continuous decrease; a new bottom was set in 2009 with only 40 regional rounds of negotiations. Since then, it was a stable amount of about 40 necessary rounds throughout the years. The fact that in 2010 a result was already reached in the second round of negotiations – during the period when industrial action is excluded – was certainly an exception caused by the crisis. Nevertheless, it gives us hope that the processes can be streamlined in future.

The terms of the most recent collective agreements have been between one-and-a-half and two years. This suggests that planning reliability is also a valuable commodity for M+E establishments in difficult economic times and that they prefer clarity about future overall conditions to a slightly more favourable collective agreement with only a short term.



Baden-Württemberg remains at the top of the table as the most frequent pilot region. Nine of the seventeen settlements agreed since 1991 were negotiated there. Agreements later adopted by the other member associations were reached four times in North Rhine-Westphalia and twice in Lower Saxony; two pilot agreements were reached in Bavaria.

## 5. Mini-dictionary on the mechanics of collective bargaining

### Adjustment clause (*Anpassungsklausel*)

In an adjustment clause, the parties to the collective agreement agree to review the collective agreement under certain conditions or if certain economic or political situations arise. Several different forms with different levels of binding force are conceivable in this context: the least binding is a *simple consultation clause* ("*reine Sprechklausel*": the parties merely agree to start talks), whereas a *hardwired clause* (*fest verdrahtete Klausel*) triggers immediate mandatory action (the two sides agree that, if certain predefined criteria are met, the collective agreement must be amended to a predetermined extent or will be renegotiated). One example of this is the re-opener clause agreed in the 2015 Collective Agreement on Flexible Transition (*Flexibler Übergang*): the collective agreement is suspended within six months if the overall legal framework changes.

There are two variants of adjustment clauses: a traditional re-opener clause and a rework clause.

- The effect of the classic **re-opener clause** (*Revisionsklausel*) is *from top to bottom*, thus making it possible to cut or postpone previously agreed parts of the agreement.
- The **rework clause** (*Nachbesserungsklausel*) has a *bottom-up* effect; it thus offers the prospect of topping up or bringing forward previously agreed parts of the agreement. Such clauses have not yet been agreed in the M+E industry, however.

These clauses need to be distinguished from the establishment-related components already described in Chapter 3 in which the parties at the establishment level agree – under a regional collective agreement that remains valid – how it should be specifically implemented at the establishment level.

## Burden/volume (*Belastung/Volumen*)

There are different possible ways to quantify the results of pay settlements. On the one hand there is the purely commercial view of the burden of pay settlements on the companies over a given period – either in a calendar year or the average over the term of the agreement. On the other hand there is the volume-based view of the collective agreement. It measures the change in the pay level itself, but also helps assess settlements with different terms.

- **Burden over a calendar year:** This commercial or business way of looking at a settlement is geared to a company's costing period. In other words, it is not the term of the collective agreement that counts, but always only the respective calendar year – or the months of a collective agreement (that lasts more than one calendar year) that fall within the respective calendar year.

Calculation: The first step is to determine both for each individual month and for the holiday and Christmas bonus the total amount by which the burden rises or falls compared to the corresponding month of the previous year as a result of all old and new settlements (including all components such as one-off payments, wage increases, etc.). Next, the average burden for the calendar year is calculated from these individual figures. In most pay-scale regions, the additional holiday pay amounts to the equivalent of 0.69 months' pay and the Christmas bonus to 0.55 months' pay in this context. This means that the pay-scale year (*Tarifjahr*) usually consists of 13.24 months (12.0 + 0.55 + 0.69 months). This has the effect – which initially seems paradoxical – that a one-off payment that will not be made in the following year leads – from the accounting perspective – to a reduction in the burden, i.e. it reduces the burden in the subsequent year – for example a wage increase – by the same amount.

- **Burden per month of the term:** This is also a commercial or business way of looking at a settlement. Here, the focus is not on the calendar year, but on the average burden during the term of the agreement – including any previous burdens.

Calculation: The first step is again to determine for each month and for the holiday and Christmas bonus the entire burden compared to the corresponding month of the previous year (again including all components such as wage increases, one-off payments, etc.). These individual figures are then added up and the sum subsequently divided by the number of months the agreement is to run for, plus the special payments converted into monthly wages/salaries.

Calculation example: In a fifteen-month period from 1 January 2015 to 31 March 2016, a total of 16.24 months' salaries are paid (15 months + 1 x Christmas bonus + 1 x holiday bonus).

- **Volume over the term:** This way of looking at a pay settlement only measures the burden that is caused by the new pay deal – i.e. the total amount that is paid during the term (one-off payments, wage increases, etc.) – without any previous burdens. The level of pay according to the collective agreement – as an average over the term of the new agreement – is thus compared with the level at the end of the old agreement's term.
- **Volume over the term per year:** This way of looking at a pay settlement only serves to make it possible to compare the bargaining value of collective agreements with different terms. In other words the question is whether a larger pay increase over a longer term is better or worse from the bargaining point of view than a lower pay increase over a shorter period.

Calculation: To do this, the volume over the term is calculated as above; then this figure is related to twelve months. This is done by a simple rule of three (percentage volume of the term x 12 months / the term in months).

Calculation example: A wage increase of 3 percent over 12 months has the same value per year as a 4 percent increase over 16 months – namely 3 percent ( $4 \times 12/16$ ).

### Differentiation (*Differenzierung*)

Differentiation means a different volume of certain payments and benefits from one establishment to another; it thus refers to the "opening" of a collective agreement (in the sense of an escape clause) **via the company axis**. This is possible with regard to pay or to working hours: the regional collective agreement prescribes a framework from whose volume the individual companies can deviate depending on their operational needs. This must be distinguished from → flexibilization. Examples of differentiation include:

- **Pay:** The € 310 one-off payment negotiated in the 2006 collective agreement, which could be doubled to € 620 or reduced to € 0 at the establishment level.
- **Working hours:** Some companies use the 13 or 18 percent clause, according to which the 40-hour week applies for 13 or 18 percent of the employees in the establishment, and the 35-hour week for all the others. Other companies do not use this clause.

### One-off payment (*Einmalzahlung*)

A one-off payment is not included in the pay scales (Entgelttabellen) and therefore does not permanently burden a company's cost accounting. It can be paid as a percentage or as a → lump sum and can perform several functions. Among other things it is used for → differentiation, for levelling (→ basic amount), for bridging the period between the end of the old collective agreement and the beginning of the new wage increase (→ zero months), or to ease the burden caused by a wage increase.

Different combinations of wage increases and one-off payments can lead to a large number of solutions that are equal in value *in the medium term*, whose respective → volume varies significantly, and which lead to completely different burdens in the long term (due to their different wage increases).

Calculation example: In the assessment of the parties to the collective agreement, the following combinations of wage increases and one-off payments have the same *medium-term* value of 2.5 percent, depending on the value of the one-off payment (in the example, a fictitious "exchange rate" of 1:2 is assumed for compensating the wage increase by a single one-off payment):

- 2 percent wage increase plus 1 percent one-off payment (volume = 3 percent),
- 1,5 percent wage increase plus 2 percent one-off payment (volume = 3.5 percent),
- 1 percent wage increase plus 3 percent one-off payment (volume = 4 percent).

### Flexibilization (*Flexibilisierung*)

Flexibilization means a different distribution of certain payments and benefits from one establishment to another; it thus refers to the "opening" of a collective agreement (in the sense of an escape clause) **via the time axis**. Up to now the concept has only been implemented for working hours, but not for pay: the regional agreement prescribes a standard pay scale that must be honoured not at a certain *point* in time, but as an average over a *period* of time. This must be distinguished from → differentiation. Examples of flexibilization include:

- **Working hours:** Working hours are distributed in such a way that all employees work longer hours during economic boom phases and shorter hours in times of economic downturn – with hours averaging out as a 35-hour working week.
- **Pay:** No flexibilization has been agreed up to now. A theoretical example would be if the Christmas bonus were allowed to fluctuate over three years, depending on company profits, but must average 55 percent over this period.

### Economic-cycle-related bonus (*Konjunkturbonus*)

An economic-cycle-related bonus is a one-off payment that is specified in the regional collective agreement and limited in size; it limits the wage increase in economically good times in order to avoid permanent increases in costs. The parties to the collective agreement together decide the extent to which the scope specified in the regional agreement is exhausted. The economic-cycle-related bonus can therefore also be called an **establishment-related component**. Of course, every company is at liberty to voluntarily pay a higher bonus.

Example: The 2007 collective agreement for the M+E industry agreed an economic-cycle-related bonus of 0.7 percent: companies whose financial situation required it could postpone the bonus and the beginning of the second → stage by up to four months.

### Term (*Laufzeit*)

The term specifies the period for which the collective agreement applies. The most common term is 12 months; it is rarely shorter and often longer. In recent years, for example, terms between 18 and 24 months have dominated; the longest period to date has been three years.

A long term has advantages and disadvantages. It creates planning reliability for employers and employees, but at the same time increases the risk of a collective agreement setting the wrong bargaining priorities ("poking around in the fog"). Assuming a given wage increase, the term depends on the projected economic development: if a lower subsequent settlement is expected, the employers have an interest in a short term, the union in a long one. However, if a higher subsequent settlement is expected, the opposite will be the case, with employers seeking a long term and the union a short one.

A longer term makes it possible to spread the wage increase of a collective agreement over a longer period, thus reducing the average burden over the term, because the next pay rise begins later.

Example: A 5 percent pay increase over a 24-month term burdens companies with the full 5 percent in the first year, with 0 percent in the second year, and an average of 2.5 percent.

There is therefore a trade-off between the length of the term of the agreement, the short-term burden and the long-term burden. This trade-off has to be carefully worked out separately in each collective bargaining round: a low wage increase for 10 weeks has just as little effect as a high wage increase for 10 years.

If the aim is to reduce a strong outflow of liquidity at the beginning of the term, a wage increase in several → stages is to be recommended: i.e. because further pay increases will follow in the next stages, the increase can be smaller at the beginning; it no longer has to cover the entire term as a one-off increase.

### Zero month (month of pay freeze) (*Nullmonat*)

Zero months (pay-freeze months) are periods when the old collective agreement has expired and the new wage increase does not yet apply. Zero months are usually at the beginning or end of the term and are often compensated by a → one-off payment. They ease the long-term burden of a collective agreement, but can cause higher costs in the short term when they are offset by a → one-off payment preceding the → wage increase.

### Lump-sum payment (*Pauschalzahlung*)

A lump-sum payment usually refers to a one-off payment that is shown not as a percentage, but as a fixed amount in euros. The trade union frequently demands a lump-sum payment as a "social component", since it means a disproportionately large increase in income for the lower income groups. However, it simultaneously makes work more expensive in the lower income groups, thus increasing these employees' risk of losing their job. The → basic amount is a combination of a percentage and a lump-sum payment.

### Basic amount (*Sockelbetrag*)

If a pay increase of "x percent, but at least y euros" is agreed, y denotes the basic amount. To this extent it is a combination of a percentage and a → lump-sum payment, i.e. a compromise between the interests of the upper and lower salary groups.

### Steps (*Stufen*)

A pay increase can be awarded in several steps within the term of the collective agreement. This avoids the large liquidity outflow at the beginning of the term that would arise if a high-initial wage increase is combined with a long term (→ term). Each wage step forms a base on which the following step builds. The 2016 collective agreement is an example: the pay scale was raised by 2.8 percent in the first step and by a further 2 percent in the second. At the end of the term, the wage level was 4.85 percent higher due to the effect of compound interest (→ volume).

### Wage increase (*Tabellenerhöhung*)

The proportion of an increase by which the pay scales are permanently raised: it thus means that a cost burden is made permanent and also applies when an establishment is having a difficult time. This must be distinguished from → one-off payments, which have no effect on the scale and only increase the employees' pay temporarily during the term of the collective agreement.

### Distribution margin (*Verteilungsspielraum*)

There is no generally accepted scientific formula for calculating the distribution margin. When formulating their demands, trade unions base their calculations on what is known as the cost-neutral distribution margin. They traditionally calculate this as the sum of average labour-productivity growth and the rise in inflation. This understanding is not convincing, and therefore Gesamtmetall has never followed this interpretation, for two reasons:

- Firstly, there is no consensus on whether it is the task of wage policy to offset inflation at all.

As early as the nineteen-sixties the German Council of Economic Experts demanded that, in a situation of full employment, the development of wages should focus on the objective of a stable price level; this is achieved whenever nominal wages and labour productivity change at the same rate, i.e. when unit labour costs remain stable. According to this concept of **productivity-oriented wage policy**, therefore, the wage-

policy distribution margin is determined solely by the macroeconomic change in labour productivity. There is no mention of offsetting price changes. If there is underemployment, productivity growth (after adjustment for the so-called dismissing productivity) should even be reduced in order to increase employment (**employment-oriented wage policy**).

The modifications made by the Council in the later years – the inclusion of additional factors such as capital costs, employers' social-security contributions and imported inputs – do not provide for any offsetting of price changes affecting the workers either. According to this concept of **cost-level-neutral wage policy**, the scope for wage increases declines whenever capital costs increase as a percentage of total costs, or when the real terms of trade worsen – and vice versa. Not only must wage policy not, therefore, itself generate any inflationary pressure, it should – acting as a repair service – neutralize all inflationary tendencies: when other costs rise, labour costs must fall. Price increases – caused, for example, by higher import prices, higher excise duties or governmental charges – are then borne by workers' real incomes. Conversely, following this compensatory logic, wages can rise faster than productivity when there is an easing of other costs.

Compensation for price changes is only provided for in the concept of **distribution-neutral wage policy**, which is propagated by the trade unions. A wage increase is distribution-neutral if it leaves the relationship between employment income and capital income unchanged and thus keeps labour's share of national income stable. The distribution-neutral margin is calculated from the change in labour productivity – i.e. the extent to which the average working hour becomes more productive – plus the change in the distribution-relevant price level. However, this concept has serious consequences, because wage increases of this magnitude may be distribution-neutral, but they are not cost-neutral or employment-neutral: if they can be passed on in the form of price increases in the subsequent period, they will push up the future inflation rate (and thus reduce employees' real income). If they cannot be passed on, they force companies to cut costs elsewhere (e.g. by laying off staff) or to reduce companies' future profits – and thus the prospects for growth and employment.

- Furthermore, there is no variable that expresses the change in the distribution-relevant price level correctly and finally as a single number.

The **consumer-price index** focused on by the trade unions is unsuitable as an indicator because it also includes price increases that do not lead to higher entrepreneurial or unearned incomes – e.g. price increases caused by higher public charges or excise duties. The same applies for price increases caused by higher import prices, e.g. for energy or other inputs. They mean a redistribution of resources at the expense of the domestic economy. If this loss of real income is fully compensated by wage policy – as it was after the first Oil Crisis in 1973/74 – and passed on in full to businesses, job losses are almost inevitable. This is because the double rise in costs (more expensive energy and higher wages) is not offset by an increase in productivity. And there is another flaw: the cost-of-living index does not take price changes in capital goods or intermediate goods into account.

The so-called deflator of the gross domestic product (GDP) is a more suitable choice, although this **GDP deflator** also includes price effects caused by changes in government prices, public charges and indirect taxes (value-added tax, excise duties) – and must therefore be adjusted for this. The adjustment ensures that only price changes that directly affect the development of private capital income are included in the wage formula – and not changes that are induced – and subsequently skimmed off – by the state. Otherwise, there would be a risk of a wage-price spiral which the European Central Bank would have to counter with a restrictive monetary policy – at the expense of investment and growth.



## **6. Annex: Tables**

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6.23 Real nominal annual pay under the collective agreement

## 6.1 IG Metall's demand: main demand

Pay round	Demand	Term in months
1991	11.0 %	12
1992	9.0 to 9.5 %	12
1994	5.5 to 6.0 %	12
1995	6.0 %	12
1997	5.0%	12
1999	6.5 %	12
2000	5.5 %	12
2002	6.5 %	12
2004	4.0 %	12
2006	5.0 %	12
2007	6.5 %	12
2009	8.0 %	12
2010	(no numerical demand)	
2012	6.5 %	12
2013	5.5 %	12
2015	5.5 %	12
2016	5.0 %	12

## 6.2 IG Metall's demand: subsidiary demands

Pay round	Supplementary or additional demands
1991	Minimum pay rise of DM 230-280; apprentices' pay: DM 150-270
1992	--
1994	Apprentices' pay 6-10 %; up to 2 % of the pay demand deductible for job-safeguarding measures; limits on overtime
1995	Apprentices' pay 6.4-10.8 %; bigger increase for lower pay groups; entitlement to unpaid leave (regional)
1997	Reserve 2.5-3 % of the demanded 5 % for employment measures
1999	Apprentices' pay: DM 90 per training year; advance introduction of ERA (BaWü); time wage bonus
2000	Take on apprentices for 12 months; extend the collective agreement (CA) on Capital-Forming Benefits (CA CFB [TV VWL]); early retirement for older workers at 60
2002	Apprentices' pay 6.5-12.5 %; launch ERA
2004	Disproportionately large increase in apprentices' pay (regional)
2006	CA on training; re-introduce CA CFB supplemented by a pension component
2007	Disproportionately large increase in apprentices' pay (regional); initiative to continue part-time working for older employees; payment of tuition fees (request for talks)
2009	Code on equality of temporary agency work (regional); tuition fees (regional)
2010	Guarantee no fall in real wages; job security through short-time working and reduced working hours involving only partial cuts in pay; take on more trainees; allow more say on temporary agency work (regional); expand part-time working for older employees (regional)
2012	Permanent contract for apprentices after apprenticeship; entry qualification for low and unskilled young people; co-determination of the works council regarding temporary agency work (volume, duration, area and criteria of application)
2013	---
2015	Revision of collective rules on partial retirement, especially higher step-up payments for lower salary groups; collectively agreed educational part-time, in particular for the three target groups (low and unskilled people, young trainees who have completed their training and employees after a long working period.
2016	---

### 6.3 IG Metall's demand: justification of demand

Pay round	Macroeconomic productivity	Prices	Redistribution/ fairness
1991	2.5 %	4.0 %	4.5 %
1992	1.5 to 2.0 %	4.0 to 4.5 %	3.5 %
1994	Just under 3.0 %	Just under 3 %	--
1995	3.5 %	2.5 %	--
1997	2.5 to 3.0 %	2.0 to 2.5 %	--
1999	2.5 %	1.5 %	2.5 %
2000	3.5 %	2.0 %	--
2002	2.0 %	2.0 %	2.5 %
2004	2.0 %	1.3 %	0.7 %
2006	2.0 %	2.0 %	1.0 %
2007	1.8 %	2.3 %	2.4 %
2009	1.5 %	2.5 %	4.0 %
2010	(no numerical demand)		
2012	1.0 %	2.0 %	3.5 %
2013	1.5 %	2.0 %	2.0 %
2015	1.5 %	2.0 %	2.0 %
2016	1.1 %	2.0 %	1.9 %

## 6.4 Employers' offer/proposal: term and wage increase

Pay round	Term in months	Wage increase and one-off payments
1991	12	4 %
1992	12	3.3 %
1994	12	0
1995	No numerical offer	
1997	No numerical offer	
1999	12	2 % and 0.5 % (variable) one-off payment
2000	36	1.5 % respectively in 3 stages every 12 months
2002	24	2 % respectively in 2 stages every 12 months
2004	27	1.2 % for 15 months; 1.2 % for 12 months
2006	24	1.2 % + 0.6 % one-off payment for 12 months 1.2 % + 0.4 % one-off payment for 12 months
2007	12	2.5 % + 0.5 % one-off payment
2009	12	2.1 % + 0.8 % one-off payment
2010	(No numerical proposal)	
2012	14	3 %
2013	12-13	2.3 %
2015	12	2.2 %, from 1 march (2 zero months)
2016	12	1.2 %, of which 0.9% wage increase, 0.3 % one-off payment, alternatively:
	24	2.1 % in two steps + 0.3 % one-off-payment, calculated on the basis of 12 months

## 6.5 Employers' offer/proposal: justification

Pay round	Offer formula
1991	"Less than last year" because growth and productivity lower; increase in unit labour costs too large and profit margins too narrow
1992	Productivity orientation; stabilization of unit labour costs
1994	Pay freeze
1995	Pay freeze
1997	Including 100% continued payment: pay freeze
1999	"Continuation of the moderate wage policy"
2000	Orientation towards macroeconomic productivity
2002	Orientation towards macroeconomic productivity
2004	Wage increase <i>below</i> productivity gain
2006	Macroeconomic productivity trend minus dismissing productivity
2007	List of six criteria (not hardwired)
2009	"Less than last year"; protecting competitiveness and real wages
2010	"Nothing to share"; must first regain pre-crisis position
2012	Make companies and workplaces more crisis-resistant; no recoup debate, employees have fairly participated throughout the crisis; preserve flexibility through temporary agency work; maintain to train more young people as needed.
2013	It is in between the limits of what is possible within 12-13 months; even in times of minimum growth a real wage increase; our employees are involved on a fair and reliable basis.
2015	Due to the previous increases, it results a plus of 2.6 per cent for 2015; because of the low inflation rate nominal is equal to real wage growth; early agreement is intended; therefore the offer is close to what's possible; in addition fair partial retirement (new collective agreement) and fair opportunities for education (different offers in the regions).
2016	Inflation rate and macroeconomic productivity are on a low level; provide a clear signal for more competitiveness. The aim is to achieve a responsible, differentiated and long running agreement.

## 6.6 Employers' offer/proposal: counter-demands

Pay round	Own ideas or counter-demands
1991	--
1992	--
1994	No holiday bonus; cost-related corrections to general regulations on holidays; reduction in overtime bonus
1995	Escape clause for a specific operational situation
1997	Flexibilization of Christmas bonus depending on number of sick days
1999	Profit-related Christmas bonus (optional), variable one-off payment
2000	Profit-related Christmas bonus (optional); reasonable young-for-old model with 0.5% cost deduction; deferred compensation from the CA CFB
2002	2-year term with re-opener clause, different solutions in different establishments; cost neutrality for ERA
2004	Working-hours corridor with and without pay compensation to secure the survival of company locations
2006	Escape clause on pay, CA on increasing employment, promoting employment in non-production jobs; abolition of "Steinkühler break" (BaWü)
2007	Option for a Christmas bonus that can fluctuate up or down
2009	--
2010	--
2012	Entry qualification for young people; pacification of the temporary agency work through sector supplements; extended flexibility for the establishments (increase of the 40-hour-quota by 12 percentage points, extension of the option for an fixed-term contract without objective justification by 12 months); commitment to discuss the challenges of the M+E-industries.
2013	---
2015	---
2016	---

## 6.7 Negotiation processes: regional rounds of negotiation

Pay round	Number of regional talks per round								<u>Outcome/settlement</u>	Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
1991										
1992	13	13	10	10	1				13	60
1994										
1995	10	10	10	1					10	41
1997										
1999	8	8	8	3	1	1			12	41
2000	11	11	6	2	1				10	41
2002	11	11	10	9	5	2	1		11	60
2004	11	11	10	6	1	1			11	51
2006	11	11	11	7	6	2	1		11	60
2007	11	11	11	5	1				10	49
2009	11	10	7	1					11	40
2010	2	1							10	13
2012	10	10	10	7	1				9	47
2013	11	11	9	2					10	43
2015	11	11	10	1					10	43
2016	11	11	9	1	1				10	43

How to read the table (example): In 2013 negotiations were held in eleven pay-scale regions respectively in the first and second rounds. The third round concentrated on only nine regions, the fourth on only two. In one of the two regions of the fourth round of negotiations a pilot settlement was reached and subsequently adopted by the other pay-scale regions in ten regional negotiations.



## 6.8 Negotiation processes: pilot region and chief negotiators

Pay round	Pilot region	M+E employers' chief negotiator	IG Metall's chief negotiator
1991	North Württ.-North Baden	Dr Hundt	Riester
1992	North Württ.-North Baden	Dr Hundt	Riester
1994	Lower Saxony	Röders	Peters
1995	Bavaria	Dr Hildmann	Neugebauer
1997	Lower Saxony	Niemsch	Peters
1999	Baden-Württemberg	Dr Fritsche	Huber
2000	North Rhine-Westphalia	Kannegiesser	Schartau
2002	Baden-Württemberg	Dr Zwiebelhofer	Huber
2004	Baden-Württemberg	Dr Zwiebelhofer	Hofmann
2006	North Rhine-Westphalia	Jäger	Wetzel
2007	Baden-Württemberg	Dr Roell	Hofmann
2009	Baden-Württemberg	Dr Roell	Hofmann
2010	North Rhine-Westphalia	Maier-Hunke	Burkhard
2012	Baden-Württemberg	Dr. Dulger	Hofmann
2013	Bavaria	Renkhoff-Mücke	Wechsler
2015	Baden-Württemberg	Dr. Wolf	Zitzelsberger
2016	North Rhine-Westphalia	Kirchhoff	Giesler

### Labour disputes

The following table covers only the labour disputes that were aimed directly at enforcing pay demands. It does not include strikes outside the collective bargaining rounds, such as the IG Metall's strike for the introduction of the 35-hour working week in eastern Germany in June 2003. This labour dispute was conducted in Berlin, Brandenburg and Saxony. Despite the support of about 80 percent of union members in the respective states in the strike ballot, it was called off by the IG Metall without a result on 28 June.

The table does not include the labour dispute of May 1993 in eastern Germany either, with which the IG Metall wanted to enforce the reinstatement of the "step-by-step collective agreement", which the employer had terminated for cause without notice. These strikes were called off on 13 May 1993 after an agreement on the withdrawal of the termination without notice, a longer period of wage adjustment to the western level, and a hardship clause.

## 6.9 Labour disputes: warning strikes

Pay round	Duration in days	Establishments involved	Employees involved	Working days lost
1991	28	3,342 n. r.	1,017,165 n. r.	n. r.
1992	16	5,072 n. r.	1,563,531 n. r.	n. r.
1994	34	6,954 n. r.	1,904,053 n. r.	n. r.
1995	47	4,562 n. r.	1,157,913 n. r.	n. r.
1997	--	--	--	--
1999	27 11	4,681 2,135	1,145,950 460,877	127,116
2000	13 4	333 92	70,678 13,489	1,491
2002	30 29	4,381 1,724	1,205,145 391,357	111,430
2004	22 11	1,857 703	512,721 172,255	36,228
2006	53 23	3,976 1,703	973,006 345,326	147,677
2007	8 7	1,911 647	477,740 167,393	46,605
2009	10 11	1,115 1,172	approx. 600,000 293,551	111,110
2010	--	--	--	--
2012	11 26	3,030 1,681	677,500 415,875	176,024
2013	8 13	2,619 1,550	632,000 338,359	131,052*
2015	19 30	3,095 1,737	593,474 353,584	133,935*
2016	-- 15	-- 1,573	-- 361,058	119,453*

\* The data from Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia were calculated on basis of a 38-hour-week, further date on basis of a 35-hour-week.

Red: information from IG Metall; blue: information from Gesamtmetall; n. r.: not recorded

The discrepancies are a result of different assessments of whether certain actions could be considered "warning strikes"; this concept is not unequivocally defined.

### 6.10 Labour disputes: participation in the IG Metall's ballot

Pay round	First ballot (on beginning industrial action) as a percentage	Second ballot (on ending industrial action) as a percentage
1994	92.2 (Lower Saxony)	63.6 (Lower Saxony)
1995	88.4 (Bavaria)	73.5 (Bavaria)
2002	90.04 (BaWü); 62.88 (West Berlin); 70.98 (East Berlin/ Brandenburg)	56.53 (BaWü); 62.88 (West Berlin); 70.98 (East Berlin/ Brandenburg)

### 6.11 Labour disputes: industrial action

Pay round	Region	Duration in days	Establishments involved	Employees involved
1995	Bavaria	11	56	34,000
2002	Baden-Württemberg; Berlin-Brandenburg	8	166	126,105

### 6.12 Labour disputes: arbitration

Pay round	Mediator	Region	Outcome/remarks
1999	Dr H.-J. Vogel	Baden-Württemberg	Arbitrator's award rejected by Gesamtmetall board

### 6.13 Outcome: structure of term

Pay round	Months in advance	Months 1st stage	Months 2nd stage	Overall term
1991	2	10	--	12
1992	0	12	9	21
1994	5	7	--	12
1995	4	6	14	24
1997	3	12	9	24
1999	2	12	--	14
2000	2	12	10	24
2002	3	12	7	22
2004	2	13	11	26
2006	3	10	--	13
2007	2	12	5	19
2009	3	3	12	18
2010	0	11	12	23
2012	1	12	--	13
2013	2	10	8	20
2015	3	12	--	15
2016	3	9	9	21

#### 6.14 Outcome: situation of term

Pay round	Months in advance	Beginning of 1st stage	End of 1st stage	End of 2nd stage
1991	2	06/91	03/92	--
1992	0	04/92	03/93	12/93
1994	5	06/94	12/94	--
1995	4	05/95	10/95	12/96
1997	3	04/97	03/98	12/98
1999	2	03/99	02/00	--
2000	2	05/00	05/01	02/02
2002	3	06/02	05/03	12/03
2004	2	03/04	03/05	02/06
2006	3	06/06	03/07	--
2007	2	06/07	05/08	10/08
2009	3	02/09	04/09	04/10
2010	0	05/10	03/11	03/12
2012	1	05/12	04/13	--
2013	2	07/13	04/14	12/14
2015	3	04/15	03/16	
2016	3	07/16	03/17	12/17

## 6.15 Outcome: pay

Pay round	Lump sum	One-off payment	Stage 1	Stage 2
1991	DM 580	--	6.7 %	--
1992	--	--	5.4 %	3.0 %
1994	--	--	2.0 %	--
1995	DM 610	--	3.4 %	3.6 %
1997	DM 200	--	1.5 %	2.5 %
1999	DM 350	1.0 %	3.2 %	--
2000	DM 330	--	3.0 %	2.1 %
2002	€ 120	0.9 % / 0.5 %	3.1 %	2.6 %
2004	--	0.7 % / 0.7 %	1.5 %	2.0 %
2006	€ 310	--	3.0 %	--
2007	€ 400	0.7 %	4.1 %	1.7 %
2009	€ 510 / € 122	0.4 %	2.1 %	2.1 %
2010	2 × € 160	--	0 %	2.7 %
2012	--	--	4.3 %	--
2013	--	--	3.4 %	2.2 %
2015	€ 150	--	3.4 %	--
2016	€ 150	--	2.8 %	2.0 %

## 6.16 Outcome: other elements of the settlement

Pay round	Elements
1991	Advance pay increase for the three lowest income groups
1992	Christmas bonus 55 % from 1992, 60 % from 1993; apprentices' pay 1992: DM 75; 1993: DM 70 (from 4/93: one hour reduction in working hours)
1994	A ten-point cut in the Christmas bonus and a 2 % overall reduction in the calculation bases; CA on job security
1995	Apprentices' pay 3.4 % and 3.6 %; unchanged extension of the Collective Agreement on Capital-Forming Benefits (CA CFB [TV VWL]) (from 10/95: one hour reduction in working hours)
1997	100 % continued payment; payments for overtime and overtime bonuses are removed from all calculation bases
1999	Apprentices' pay linked to wage group (LG) 7; tight time frame for ERA (only in Baden-Württemberg)
2000	Apprentices' pay 3 % over the term; continue CAs on Capital-Forming Benefits (CA CFB) and on Bridge Employment
2002	Cost-neutral CA on ERA fixing the system-related additional costs at 2.79 %; formation of the ERA adjustment fund
2004	Collective Agreement for Securing the Survival of Company Locations ("Pforzheim"); agreement of higher contingents of employees with higher standard weekly working hours for establishments with many highly qualified staff ("elite contingent")
2006	CA on training; modification of the "Steinkühler break"; obligation to discuss CA on Job Creation and CA on Non-Production Jobs
2007	Statement by social partners on Flexible Transition to Retirement
2009	Start the matching funding of the costs of the CA on Flexible Transition
2010	CA "Future in Work"; in Baden-Württemberg: Collective Agreement on Short-Time Working, Training and Employment (TV KQB)
2012	Obligation to offer to all young workers who have finished an apprenticeship a permanent position; however, the employer is only obliged to do it for positions that actually need to be filled. Regional models to support low and unskilled young people; offer to takeover a temporary agency workers after 24 months, a deviation by works council agreement is possible; commitment to discuss on consequences of demography and skills shortage
2013	---
2015	Collective agreement for a flexible transition into retirement (TV FlexÜ); Collective agreement on conditions of entitlement to TV FlexÜ (TV AVo); voluntary bonuses in case of personal education possible. Regional: in Baden-Württemberg → Modification of CA Qualification (TV Q), in Bavaria → Modification of CA Qualification and CA on educational part-time, in NRW → CA Education (TV Bildung), other regions → takeover of CA Education.
2016	Joint evaluation of differentiation

## 6.17 Outcome: establishment-related component

Pay round	Volume	Details
1991	--	--
1992	--	--
1994	--	--
1995	--	--
1997	--	Statement on the regional collective agreement: deviating arrangements are possible in establishments with the approval of the parties*
1999	--	Payment of the 1 % one-off payment can be postponed
2000	--	Christmas bonus fluctuates depending on the sickness absence rate
2002	--	Temporary special arrangement by parties when economic survival is threatened
2004	--	Collective Agreement for Securing the Survival of Company Locations: deviating arrangements are possible with the approval of the parties*
2006	€ 312	Payment can be brought forward or postponed; it can deviate down to € 0 and up to € 624
2007	€ 333	2nd wage-increase stage (1.7 %) and economic-cycle-related bonus (0.7 %) can be postponed by up to 4 months
2009	€ 659	2nd wage-increase stage (2.1 %) and lump sum (€ 122) can be postponed by up to 7 months
2010	--	Wage increase (2.7 %) can be brought forward or postponed by up to 2 months
2012	--	--
2013	--	--
2015	--	--
2016	€ 440	Postponement or reduction to € 0 of the lump-sum payment possible; postponement up to 3 months of the 2nd wage step (2.0 %) possible.

\* Not an escape clause **within** the regional agreement in the sense of an establishment-related component, but an option to deviate **from** the regional collective agreement with a supplementary collective agreement



### 6.18 Outcome: normal burden

Pay round	Total volume	Volume per year	Remarks
1991	7.0 %	7.0 %	
1992	10.2 %	5.7 %	One hour reduction in working hours from 4/93
1994	0 %	0 %	
1995	7.5 %	3.8 %	One hour reduction in working hours from 10/95
1997	2.4 %	1.2 %	
1999	4.5 %	3.9 %	
2000	3.9 %	2.0 %	
2002	4.4 %	2.4 %	
2004	3.0 %	1.4 %	
2006	3.1 %	2.9 %	
2007	5.0 %	3.2 %	
2009	4.2 %	2.8 %	
2010	1.7 %	0.9 %	
2012	4.0 %	4.0 %	
2013	4.1 %	2.5 %	
2015	3.0 %	2.5 %	
2016	3.5 %	2.0 %	

### 6.19 Outcome: burden at best

Pay round	Total volume	Volume per year:	Remarks
2006	2.4 %	2.2 %	Variable (up or down) one-off payment
2007	4.5 %	2.8 %	Option to postpone wage increase and one-off payment
2009	3.2 %	2.1 %	Option to postpone wage-increase and one-off payment
2010	1.5 %	0.8 %	Option to postpone wage-increase
2012			
2013			
2015			
2016	3.0 %	1.7 %	Option to postpone wage-increase and one-off payment

## 6.20 Sustained nominal annual pay\* under the collective agreement

Year	In euros	% change on previous year	Index 1990 = 100
1991	26,095	6.4	106.4
1992	27,690	6.1	112.9
1993	28,770	3.9	117.3
1994	28,770	0	117.3
1995	30,035	4.4	122.5
1996	31,625	5.3	129.0
1997	31,780	0.5	129.6
1998	32,515	2.3	132.6
1999	33,390	2.7	136.2
2000	34,260	2.6	139.7
2001	35,080	2.4	143.1
2002	35,920	2.3	146.4
2003	36,930	2.8	150.5
2004	37,555	1.7	153.1
2005	38,270	1.9	156.0
2006	39,110	2.2	159.4
2007	40,245	2.9	164.0
2008	41,290 / 39,640**	2.6 / –	168.3 / 161,5**
2009	41,000	3.4	167,0
2010	41,210	0.5	167,9
2011	42,070	2.1	171,4
2012	43,500	3.4	177,2
2013	44,800	3.0	182,5
2014	46,280	3.3	188,6
2015	47,807	3.3	194,8
2016	48,811	2.1	198,9
2017	50,256	3.0	204,8

\* Monthly pay, holiday bonus, Christmas bonus, but **not including** one-off and lump-sum payments

\*\* According to the Framework Agreement on Pay (ERA); partly estimated; not comparable to pre-2008 figures

## 6.21 Sustained real annual pay\* under the collective agreement

Year	1990 pay-scale = 100	1990 prices = 100	Pay-scale in real terms 1990 = 100	Pay-scale in real terms: % change on previous year
1991	106,4	103,5	102,9	2,9 %
1992	112,9	108,8	103,9	1 %
1993	117,3	113,7	103,3	-0,6 %
1994	117,3	116,6	100,6	-2,6 %
1995	122,5	118,7	103,2	2,6 %
1996	129	120,4	107,1	3,8 %
1997	129,6	122,8	105,5	-1,5 %
1998	132,6	124	106,9	1,3 %
1999	136,2	124,8	109,1	2,1 %
2000	139,7	126,5	110,4	1,2 %
2001	143,1	129	111	0,5 %
2002	146,4	130,8	112	0,9 %
2003	150,5	132,3	113,8	1,6 %
2004	153,1	134,4	113,9	0,1 %
2005	156	136,6	114,2	0,3 %
2006	159,4	138,6	115	0,7 %
2007	164	141,8	115,7	0,6 %
2008	168,3 / 161,5**	145,5	115,7 / 112,7	0 % / --
2009	167,0	146	116,1	3 %
2010	167,9	147,5	115,5	-0,6 %
2011	171,4	150,6	115,4	0 %
2012	177,2	153,6	116,9	1,3 %
2013	182,5	155,9	118,7	1,5 %
2014	188,6	157,3	121,5	2,4 %
2015	194,8	157,8	125,2	3,0 %
2016	198,9	158,6	127,2	1,6 %
2017	204,8	160,8***	129,1***	1,6 %**

\* Monthly pay, holiday bonus, Christmas bonus, but **not including** one-off and lump-sum payments

\*\* According to the Framework Agreement on Pay (ERA) (partly estimated); not comparable to pre-2008 figures

\*\*\* Prognosis inflation rate 2017: 1.4 %

## 6.22 Actual nominal annual pay\* under the collective agreement

Year	In euros	% change on previous year	Index 1990 = 100
1991	26.245	7,0 %	107,0
1992	27.690	5,5 %	112,9
1993	28.770	3,9 %	117,3
1994	28.770	0 %	117,3
1995	30.035	4,4 %	122,4
1996	31.625	5,3 %	128,9
1997	31.880	0,8 %	129,9
1998	32.515	2,0 %	132,5
1999	33.870	4,2 %	138,1
2000	34.430	1,7 %	140,3
2001	35.080	1,9 %	143,0
2002	36.365	3,7 %	148,3
2003	37.115	2,1 %	151,3
2004	37.815	1,9 %	154,2
2005	38.540	3,8 %	157,1
2006	39.420	2,3 %	160,7
2007	40.245	2,1 %	164,1
2008	41.925 / 40.275**	3,2 % / –	170,9 / 164,2**
2009	41.564	2,9 %	169,0
2010	42.104	1,3 %	171,2
2011	42.656	1,3 %	173,4
2012	44.106	3,4 %	179,3
2013	45.412	3,0 %	184,6
2014	46.887	3,3 %	190,6
2015	48.575	3,6 %	197,4
2016	49.615	2,1 %	201,7
2017	50.940	2,7 %	207,1

\* Monthly pay, holiday bonus, Christmas bonus, one-off and lump-sum payments

\*\* According to the Framework Agreement on Pay (ERA) (partly estimated); not comparable to pre-2008 figures

## 6.23 Actual real annual pay\* under the collective agreement

Year	1990 pay-scale = 100	1990 prices = 100	Pay-scale in real terms 1990 = 100	Pay-scale in real terms: % change on previous year
1991	107,0	103,5	103,4	3,4 %
1992	112,9	108,8	103,8	0,4 %
1993	117,3	113,7	103,2	-0,6 %
1994	117,3	116,6	100,6	-2,5 %
1995	122,4	118,7	103,1	2,5 %
1996	128,9	120,4	107,1	3,8 %
1997	129,9	122,8	105,8	-1,2 %
1998	132,5	124,0	106,9	1,0 %
1999	138,1	124,8	110,7	3,6 %
2000	140,3	126,5	110,9	0,2 %
2001	143,0	129,0	110,9	-0,1 %
2002	148,3	130,8	113,4	2,3 %
2003	151,3	132,3	114,4	0,9 %
2004	154,2	134,4	114,7	0,3 %
2005	157,1	136,6	115,0	0,2 %
2006	160,7	138,6	115,9	0,8 %
2007	164,1	141,8	115,7	-0,2 %
2008	170,9 / 164,2**	145,5	117,5 / 112,8*	1,5 % / –
2009	169,0	146,0	115,7	2,6 %
2010	171,2	147,5	116,1	0,3 %
2011	173,4	150,6	115,2	-0,8 %
2012	179,3	153,6	116,8	1,4 %
2013	184,6	155,9	118,5	1,5 %
2014	190,6	157,8	121,4	2,4 %
2015	197,4	158,6	125,4	3,3 %
2016	201,7	158,6	127,4	1,6 %
2017	201,7	160,8***	129,1***	1,3%

\* Monthly pay, holiday bonus, Christmas bonus, one-off and lump-sum payments

\*\* According to the Framework Agreement on Pay (ERA) (partly estimated); not comparable to pre-2008 figures

\*\*\* Prognosis inflation rate 2017: 1.4 %